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Abstract
Streaming applications over Peer-To-Peer (P2P) sys-
tems have gained an enormous popularity. Success al-
ways implies increased concerns about security, pro-
tection, privacy and all the other ‘side’ properties that
transform an experimental application into a service.
Research on security for P2P streaming started to flour-
ish, but no comprehensive security analysis over the
current P2P solutions has yet been attempted. There are
no best practices in system design, no (widely) accepted
attack models, no measurement-based studies on secu-
rity threats to P2P streaming, nor even general surveys
investigating specific security aspects for these systems.
This paper addresses this last aspect.
Starting from existing analyses and security models
in the literature, we give an overview on security and
privacy considerations for P2P streaming systems. Our
analysis emphasizes two major facts: i) the Byzantine
– Altruistic – Rational (BAR) model offers stronger se-
curity guarantees compared to other approaches, at the
cost of higher complexity and overhead; and ii) the gen-
eral perception (not necessarily the truth, but a com-
monplace belief) that it is necessary to sacrifice accu-
racy or performance in order to tolerate faults or misbe-
haviors, is not always true.
— Keywords: P2P streaming, IPTV, security, pri-
vacy
1 Overview
Peer-to-peer systems have gained more and more mo-
mentum over the last years as a means to access mul-
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timedia contents, albeit initially in form of file down-
loads. The evolution to streaming and multicast (e.g.,
TV) was just a consequence. Their power to accom-
modate large amounts of users, together with their re-
silience to churn, reliability, and low cost are some
of the reasons why they are preferred over dedicated
servers or content distribution solutions. In spite of
these advantages, or maybe because of them, some P2P
features make these systems more difficult to defend
against some classes of attacks.
Security-wise, P2P streaming systems are more chal-
lenging than other P2P applications because they are
more vulnerable to QoS fluctuations. Live streaming
protocols, and TV in particular, are most sensitive to
delay and delay jitter: it is enough for a host to be pre-
vented from receiving some packets in time, and the
user may grow dissatisfied with the quality of the deliv-
ery and leave the system altogether. If some other peers
are connected to that machine, they will be damaged as
well. From the watcher’s viewpoint, even slight quality
fluctuations, or choppiness, cause the viewing experi-
ence to loose appeal and the user to drop the service (or
switch channels if others offer better quality).
Apart from their time-sensitive nature and bandwidth
dependency, P2P streaming are susceptible to manipu-
lation and threats at the transport and network layers.
Clever attacks can compromise selectively the guaran-
tees that a streaming session should provide, rendering
some channels unusable, or making the broadcast un-
available in particular locations. Both events can be
classified as targeted censorship violating the freedom
of speech and expression. Analyzing the threat models
in all these cases gives relevant indicators over possible
risks and vulnerabilities in the transmission.
In what follows, we provide a brief security analy-
sis of some of the existing P2P live streaming solu-
tions, and show a classification of both attack points and
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Aspect Influences what Results into
Peer nodes P2P protocol partitioning,censorshipQoS delays,isolation
Supernodes P2P protocol partitioning,censorshipQoS delays,isolation
Overlay routing
data privacy data leaks
QoS delays
routing partitioning,censorship
Application code P2P protocol censorshipdata privacy data leaks
Distributed data data integrity partitioning
Table 1: Common sources of vulnerabilities in P2P
streaming. The aspect in the first column indicates the
vulnerability, the second column refers to the system
feature the vulnerability influences, while the third col-
umn shows a possible result of the vulnerability being
exploited.
solutions to common vulnerabilities. We provide gen-
eral considerations and features that novel P2P stream-
ing proposals should consider in order to minimize the
chances of attack.
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 discusses the threats and security models for
P2P streaming applications, with specific attention to
P2P-TV systems. Section 3 describes the easier, and
hence readily realized, attacks in P2P streaming sys-
tems. The study continues with discussing security
practices (Sect. 4) particularly for the tree and mesh
overlays (these latter combined with data-driven dis-
semination). We conclude discussing the trade-offs of
this type of mechanisms, open issues and future work.
2 Threat and Security Models for
P2P Streaming
2.1 Threat Model
In any security analysis, it is important to consider all
possible sources of risk against any elements assumed
to be trusted. Discussing the threat model in general
P2P systems involves considering the security of peer
nodes, supernodes and overlay routing. An overview of
the threat sources in P2P streaming applications is given
in Table 1 and is detailed hereafter.
There are five major sources of vulnerabilities in P2P
streaming:
Peer nodes Malicious or malfunctioning nodes can al-
ways alter protocol behavior. For instance, they
may not reply to requests, or may reply or gen-
erate wrong messages, or they can collude. This
can result into biasing the neighbor selection pro-
cess of another node, thus into network partition-
ing or even censorship. Censorship has grave con-
sequences, as the less number of users in the proto-
col, the poorer the quality of the transmission [16].
From the point of view of QoS, peers can also
do delayed forwarding and hence jeopardize once
more live streaming and TV systems.
Supernodes Supernodes do not always exist in P2P ap-
plications, but it is envisioned that they can greatly
benefit applications requiring large bandwidth and
low, constant delays. Supernodes bring similar
vulnerabilities to streaming systems as common
peer nodes; the emphasis however is on their
higher responsibility in data dispersion: if super-
peers do not behave fairly and honestly with all
peers, they can bias the service toward preferred
users. As a consequence, partitioning and cen-
sorship are more stringent at the supernode level.
Supernodes become even more critical as some
projects explore the possibility that they are con-
trolled by ISPs in an effort to make P2P overlays
and IP networks cooperate [14].
Overlay Routing Routing messages among peers
aims at reliability and quality. Secure routing deals
with both maintaining secure routing tables, and
securely transmitting messages [25]. The data in
transit can be sniffed and if the channel is not se-
cure, it can even be leaked or modified. The dis-
patching of tampered data to fair peers depends on
the security of the routing tables; not only rout-
ing can undergo malicious delaying, but also par-
titioning (sending tainted data to the same peers)
and/or censorship (not sending anything to a group
of peers).
Application Code Wallach [25] notices that the P2P
code runs with numerous privileges on peer ma-
chines: it normally uses the network connection
and the local hard drive. When unrestricted, lo-
cal access and external communication lead to in-
formation leaks or malicious code installed on the
local machine that could alter the overall P2P pro-
tocol. The remedy is twofold: sandboxing the P2P
application to use just an isolated location on the
local drive, and denying operations that are not co-
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herent with its purposes to the P2P application.
The application code poses a particular threat to
user privacy, because embedded malware could
leak sensitive information to non-authorized recip-
ients.
Distributed Data Data integrity is essential in stream-
ing and TV systems, because the purpose of the
application is liveness. If a TV-channel is re-
distributed on the P2P system but part of the
news/programs are altered with some users treated
differently from others, this can lead to partition-
ing or in the worse case, loss of users.
2.2 Security Model
If the threat model identifies the sources of potential
jeopardy to the system, the security model identifies the
aspects of the system that are jeopardized by the threat.
In Table 2, we split these aspects into system operation
and content management concerns.
For what system operation is concerned, we identify
the following list of main properties to be granted to
streaming systems in face of threats and attacks:
Reliability The up-time of the system in steady state is
modeled by reliability. Reliability can be a global
property of the entire system or it can refer to the
vision of the system conditioned to one specific
peer or a subset of peers. A single failure, even
if recovered, implies loss of reliability.
Availability Is the ability of the system to be up and
running. A system can be unreliable, yet highly
available, simply because recovery from failures is
faster than the user/application of the system can
detect. In P2P streaming, for instance, churn can
be a source of unreliability, since peers leaving im-
plies that from the point of view of some other
peers, a portion of the system has failed. How-
ever, topology reconfiguration can be fast enough
to avoid the loss of any information so that the sys-
tem remains available even from the perspective of
peers that are affected by churn.
Dependability A system which is reliable and avail-
able may still suffer from correlated failures that
make it non-dependable. Dependability is a sub-
tler property of the system: it reflects the ability
of a system to work and derogate services in crit-
ical moments. An example will clarify the point.
Category System Feature
System operation
Reliability
Availability
Dependability
Node Autonomy
Access Control
Content management
Authenticity
Integrity
Non-repudiation
Confidentiality
Anonymity
Table 2: Desirable security and privacy features for P2P
streaming systems.
Cellular telephone systems are in general reliable
and available, however they are not dependable
with respect to emergencies and civil protection:
during accidents the cells covering the area of the
accident become congested because people call
with higher rate than normal and resources are lo-
cally insufficient; during natural disasters, besides
the above phenomenon, normally the electricity
fails, and the base stations do not have adequate
power backup. In the context of P2P streaming and
TV applications, the system may turn to be unde-
pendable because simple attacks can ruin specific
event streaming (e.g., popular broadcasts) which
causes a higher-than-average amount of traffic; in
these cases, simple traffic-volume based attacks
can jeopardize the most useful (or prized) events.
Node Autonomy This is a requirement specific to P2P
systems. Each node is peer with all the others and
its autonomous functioning should be guaranteed
at all times: at any point during service, each node
should be empowered to perform the actions that
it is specified to perform at that step, without the
need of external intervention. Any external call
that the node makes at the protocol runtime is an
indication that the node may not be autonomous.
Access Control Some applications (e.g., public TV)
require no access control for service provision,
but others may be limited to groups of authorized
users: membership is controlled, and the system
should provide means to protect membership in
face of attacks, both for breaking the control and
for denying service to authorized members.
The properties most delicate in a P2P TV or stream-
ing system are availability and dependability; however,
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node autonomy may be a requirement to prevent cen-
sorship attacks, and access control can be fundamental
for commercial services.
Considering now content management, we have the
usual aspects and properties threatened, but also some
that are specific to P2P streaming:
Authenticity and Integrity The data transmitted at
protocol runtime must be guaranteed and not tam-
pered with, and it must be guaranteed that it was
emitted by the intended transmission entity.
Non-repudiation Refers to the situation when the
nodes that received a certain piece of data cannot
deny that they received it.
Confidentiality The content that is transmitted during
the streaming process can only be used or retrans-
mitted to other nodes involved in the protocol.
This property interlaces with access control. In
fact an access control system that prevents unau-
thorized participation to a streaming, but is not
supported by a content management system that
can prevent recording and later replication of the
content becomes useless. Recent studies on com-
mercial TV streaming solutions have shown that
they do not perform encryption [4], which makes
the protocol lose not only confidentiality but also
authenticity and integrity.
Anonymity This is one of the most controversial prop-
erties, since in many contexts he property of a user
to remain anonymous is associated to potentially
unlawful activities. However, specifically in TV
systems, the right of a user to watch a program
without disclosing his identity is key to privacy
protection and is guaranteed by broadcasting sys-
tems. This property should be guaranteed also by
P2P streaming systems, not only in face of external
observers, but also with respect to the other users
of the same system.
Haridasan and van Renesse argue that not all appli-
cations need anonymity and confidentiality, but the fea-
tures that matter most in frequent cases, are authenticity,
integrity and non-repudiation [10]. Still, we have seen
that anonymity becomes a key issue of privacy protec-
tion in TV systems. Non-repudiation, in the same sys-
tems, may be of secondary concern, unless a node can
build claims on the fact that some information has not
been delivered.
2.3 Assets to be protected
For P2P systems, there are two important values to be
protected so that the protocol functions fairly: i) the
data exchanged between peers, and ii) the hardware and
software resources of each node. Exchanged data is es-
sential. In streaming systems the data being shared has
a time window associated with the playout time: the
data turns stale when the playout. This adds a new di-
mension to the problem of data protection: delay makes
data useless. Bandwidth is another important resource.
As P2P systems are decentralized, it is usually easy for
malicious peers to flood the system with their requests
in such a way that they would exhaust the bandwidth of
the system [5].
2.4 Auditing
Auditing is a detective means by which violations of
predefined courses of actions can be identified. Audit-
ing is an ‘after the fact’ measure and the outcome of its
analysis influences future course of actions. Auditing
requires the existence of logs with recordings of certain
activity, the mechanism that is periodically triggered to
write to these logs, and an auditor —the entity verifying
the logs. As far as the checking mechanism is involved,
auditing can be continuous —at certain time intervals or
on all records— or probabilistic —at random moments
of time or on random recordings.
In P2P systems, audit can function as a means to
check whether a peer node functions according to a pre-
defined contract or protocol. The idea of distributed au-
dit in the sense that nodes trade local storage with stor-
age on other nodes, is hinted in [25]. Of course, in order
to perform it, the auditing method must be secured; this
involves making sure that any nodes cannot influence
what is being written in the logs, nor hide the logs them-
selves. Full access to query these logs must be entrusted
to the requesting entity; moreover, the mechanism eval-
uating the events logged in the file must not misinterpret
or ignore anything that was recorded. A simple way to
ensure that most of these conditions are satisfied, is to
impose a reward/punishment/incentive mechanism that
makes the entities involved in the audit process cheat as
little as possible.
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Target Attacks
Node autonomy
Membership/Eclipse attack
Neighbor selection attack
Collusion attack
Confidentiality and integrity Forgery attackPollution attack
Node authentication Sybil attack
Dependability and availability DoS omission attack
Table 3: Common attacks in P2P streaming systems.
3 Common Attacks in P2P
Streaming Systems
Most serious attacks in P2P systems comes from the in-
side of the system and involve more than just a single
node. This happens because only an internal node runs
the internal protocols used between hosts, and can thus
exploit them. In the BAR gossip model [15], for in-
stance, nodes are known once they join the system and
moreover, an unknown node has a very restricted set of
actions that it can perform. Therefore, the security of
P2P application should look to protect internal nodes
from other (malicious) internal nodes. In what follows
we will focus on some possible situations of vulnerabil-
ity and describe the favorable conditions in which they
take place.
Collusion attacks As observed in [10], these attacks
occur when one malicious node compromises a
set of nodes to conduct correlated attacks onto the
whole system. This type of attack breaks the node
autonomy requirement stated in the previous sec-
tion. As expected, these are the most dangerous
attacks since it may be extremely difficult to track
down the attacker if nodes function correctly at
each step or on short-term, while overall misbe-
having or deviating the protocol on the long run.
Forgery attacks Forgery attacks break the condition
of confidentiality and integrity of data mentioned
in the previous section as a requirement of P2P
streaming systems. The data being transmitted
is tampered with, therefore a cryptographic tech-
nique as e.g., the use of message signatures, can
easily solve the vulnerability.
Membership and Eclipse attacks With this type of
attacks, the membership protocol or the way nodes
are admitted into the overlay are compromised. A
special type of membership attack is the Eclipse at-
tack, where, as noticed in [24], an attacker which
controls a portion of the overlay neighbor scheme,
eclipses fair nodes by dropping or rerouting any
messages meant for those nodes. In other words, in
Eclipse attacks, the attacker can gain some control
over the routing mechanisms in the P2P system.
Unstructured overlays are more susceptible to this
type of attacks than the structured overlays; the
latter do impose some constraints over the neigh-
bors of one node, while the former do not. For
this reason, the unstructured overlays use floods of
random walks to gain knowledge of the network
topology; the more they use these mechanisms,
the higher the probability that an attacker will con-
trol more nodes in the system. One possible solu-
tion described in [24] is to use a mechanism that
bounds the in-degree and out-degree of the nodes
in the P2P overlay. In this way, an attacker is pre-
vented from communicating with more nodes than
what normally should.
Neighbor selection attacks These attacks refer to the
situations in which an attacker controls the neigh-
bor selection mechanism of some nodes, and
makes them choose it as information provider. Ma-
licious nodes can thus infiltrate and dominate sets
of neighbors. The attacker will influence the way
the overlay communicates and the neighbor selec-
tion process happens, so that it can control the traf-
fic and subvert the whole system. These attacks
are referred to as epidemic by [21], as fair nodes
will “unknowingly reference compromised peers
in their neighbor set”. Of course, the problem is
even worse if the membership server is itself at-
tacked in this way. One idea of solving this prob-
lem with Distributed Hash Tables is to identify the
invariants in the placement of peers in the overlay,
and detect attacks in the form of deviations from
these invariants. A solution adapted to mesh-based
systems is shown in [21].
Sybil attacks These attacks happen when the reputa-
tion mechanism established within the P2P system
is compromised. Specifically, an attacker creates
a large number of entities which bear the same
disguised identity in order to become more pow-
erful. Depending on how the id-s of nodes and
reputation constraints are generated, the reputation
system may be more or less vulnerable to such at-
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tacks. The idea is that once disguised, the attacker
profits from the trust that is given to the real entity
it impersonates.
Guarding against such attack may involve a trusted
third entity which certifies that a name or a reputa-
tion id is attached to the exact entity it is supposed
to carry it. Therefore, certified node identifiers is
one of the most straightforward techniques to re-
pel masquerading. In addition to this method, au-
diting is another way to prevent the Sybil attack.
An interesting solution employing auditing is pro-
vided in [24], where a node periodically challenges
one of its neighbors to provide it with a list of that
node’s inbound contacts; if that list appears unfair
or tampered with, then the requester node can act
upon this discovery.
DoS attacks Denial of Service happens when mali-
cious nodes send excessive amounts of requests
or duplicate packets intended for their peers. The
ability to bring a contribution to the streaming ses-
sion is thus compromised, because a fair node
would be flooded with useless messages or too
many requests for it to handle. In this way, the
resources of the system are exhausted with a rel-
atively small effort on the attacker side. When
the resource on which the attack focuses is band-
width, the attack has been also termed as request
spreading attack [5]. These problems were pre-
viously studied in the case of distributed systems
as well as P2P streaming scenarios and there are
several approaches in counteracting this type of at-
tacks [6, 5, 26].
Omission attacks are at the other extreme than DoS
attacks, implying that all the packet of data or just
a part of it is not sent further according to the pro-
tocol specification. Again, just like for the DoS
attacks, this behavior can compromise the whole
P2P system even if a small number of peers col-
lude. As noted by [10], the problem with this at-
tack is that the guilt of a node cannot be proved
easily.
Pollution attacks in P2P streaming occur when the at-
tacker mixes junk pieces of data into the P2P dis-
tribution. In this way, the quality of the trans-
mission decreases considerably: polluted chunks
which arrive at fair peers degrade the protocol ef-
ficiency, and in the same time these peers will for-
ward the junk to other peers and the whole effect
Figure 1: Important structural aspects in securing P2P
streaming.
will exponentially span over the network. Proof
that the effects of this type of attack can be devas-
tating in a streaming scenario are given by Dhun-
gel et al., along with proposing four possible de-
fenses: blacklisting, traffic encryption, hash verifi-
cation and chunk signing [7].
4 Security practices
In this section we provide a close-up on the existing se-
curity solutions in P2P streaming. We expose and dis-
cuss the vulnerabilities of each approach and then de-
rive a few patters and conclusions that would help in
protecting against attacks in P2P streaming systems.
As shown in Fig. 1, there are two building blocks of
P2P systems to be considered: overlay topology and
data dissemination mechanisms. The topology of the
overlay defines how to connect each node in the net-
work with the right neighbors; in other words, in a situ-
ation in which nodes are constantly joining and leaving
the system, to find a solution in which each node sees as
its neighbors only the nodes it is most interested (and is
fair) to communicate with. The criteria to choose neigh-
bor range from locality to certain QoS values.
In itself a non-trivial problem, the topology of the
overlay is in tight connection with the application: the
application domain determines the topology of the net-
work, while in its turn the overlay topology influences
runtime application aspects that can be either functional
or non-functional: searching, routing, performance, ef-
ficiency, robustness [11, 2, 3]. In complex applications,
where the topology changes dynamically, the mecha-
nisms involved in the construction of the overlay have
increased importance because they are invoked contin-
uously; consequently, keeping these mechanisms pro-
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tected against attacks becomes essential in order to
maintain their compliance with the protocol schemes.
According to several other classification studies [28,
20, 18, 16] that there are two typical overlay topologies
in P2P streaming applications:
1. Tree-shaped overlays: in which the overlay is usu-
ally built in the shape of a tree. This means that
the way in which overlay nodes send and receive
messages is structured and embedded in the over-
lay topology: The source is the root of the tree and
leaf nodes receive but not redistribute the data;
2. Mesh-shaped overlays: where the overlay has the
structure of a generic mesh. That is, every peer has
one or more parent peers and a set of child peers
and there is not a definite structure. The media is
distributed among different peers and then each of
them transmits the media further.
Apart from the overlay construction, the other defin-
ing aspect of P2P systems is the data dissemination
mechanism among peers. That is, while the overlay
deals with connecting a node with the right neighbors,
the data dissemination algorithm is concerned with
how to pick member pairs of nodes that communicate.
Again, there are two or sometimes three basic ways of
disseminating data in P2P streaming systems [16, 23]:
1. The push, or source-driven approach means that a
peer transmits a chunk to its neighbors, assuming
they do not have it yet; the directions in which the
data is sent are determined by the parent-child re-
lationship among nodes, be it a tree or mesh over-
lays. It is easy to see this way of performing data
dissemination is prone to redundant pushes and
thus to DoS attacks (e.g., flooding neighbors with
data they already have), to neighbor selection and
omission attacks (bias in where to push data);
2. The pull, or receiver-driven approach is an alter-
native to the previous scheme, by which a peer
uses buffer maps to create pull schedule with the
peers it decides to communicate with. A peer re-
quests the information it is missing. This approach
is more robust than the previous, but vulnerable to
collusion: peers that already have data may not ad-
vertise it to others;
3. the data-driven approach does not differentiate be-
tween push and pull interactions, but allows each
entity to randomly choose the neighbors it wants to
exchange information with. Epidemic algorithms
are instantiating this approach, an gossiping ones
in particular. Gossip in P2P is a data dissemina-
tion mechanism that does not employ the support
of the overlay but can manage itself overlay pat-
terns. It is also useful in data aggregation and re-
source allocation [13]. The reason for its popular-
ity is that gossiping mechanisms are simple and
more robust than others. Security-wise, we be-
lieve they are interesting to study because they are
more general than the push and pull mechanisms.
The biasing vulnerabilities suffered by the other
approaches are easily solved with gossip, since it
is not easily predictable in which way data flows.
In addition, as previously noted [23], gossip-based
mechanisms are less sensitive to peer dynamics,
thus to churn.
For the reasons above, in what follows we will an-
alyze the two overlay approaches in conjunction with
the gossip protocol from a security standpoint. We
will bring into light what are the vulnerabilities and
strengths induced to the systems that adopt these ap-
proaches.
4.1 Tree-based Approaches
Generally, streaming in tree-based overlays imposes
that the source of the media is the root of the tree, and
that the rest of the peers are children of the source and
children/parents among themselves. The path that the
data must follow in this case is fixed: first from the
source to the first-order parents, then from those to their
children, and so on. A visible functional problem that
occurs with this kind of overlay structure is simple: the
efficiency of the hierarchy is overcome by the large im-
balance between parent nodes and leaf nodes (parents
forward data while leaves do not, so everybody wants
to be a leaf). Historically, the solution to this issue took
the form of multi-tree overlays, as [21, 20] notice, in
other words: more leaves, more trees. This approach
leads to distributing the data in multiple distinct trees.
There are other problems related to the topology of
this overlay [28, 16], and they are summarized in Ta-
ble 4. Since in tree overlays each node receives data
from only one source node, bandwidth fluctuations can
be highly damaging, and paths that are closer to the
root are more likely to turn into bottlenecks. Security-
wise, minor protocol deviations of single nodes can af-
fect easily entire subtrees. More, when nodes closer
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Envisaged solutions Problem /attacks
Using multi-trees, gossip
Imbalance root vs. leafs
Bandwidth fluctuation, bottleneck
Protocol deviations on parent node
Monitor,acknowledgment
Identifying malicious nodes
DoS, omission
Membership attacks
Signatures forgery, repudiation
Not yet solved Sybil attacks
Table 4: Common fairness and security issues in tree-
based P2P streaming systems.
to the root leave the system (e.g. they crash or are at-
tacked), they leave unserviced a large percentage of the
nodes.
Trying to solve the above problems, Zhou and Liu
have combined the tree overlay with gossip data dis-
semination so that the two approaches would compen-
sate each other’s faults [28]. Because the tree model
is brittle but yet time-efficient, it is used as a second
option: by default all data is transmitted by gossiping,
and if a node does not receive anything for a certain pe-
riod of time, the tree overlay will help it obtain the data
from its parent. Security-wise, because the protection
level for a composite system is the protection level of
its weakest link, this solution is prone to all vulnerabil-
ities of the tree overlay.
Another solution adopted in tree-based overlays is
presented by Shetty et al. in [22]. In the tree-shaped
overlay, the streaming quality depends on the cooper-
ation of the non-leaf nodes (namely the nodes in the
overlay tree that are neither leaves nor the source). The
possible attacks that are considered are thus DoS, omis-
sion, forgery and repudiation attacks. Shetty et al. iden-
tify that one of the problems with the current security
solutions in P2P streaming is that they cannot identify
the malicious nodes themselves, just the fact that there
are malicious nodes. This is because in overlay multi-
cast streaming, if a fair peer receives tampered data, it
cannot determine if its parent is malicious (since its par-
ent might have taken that data from some other peer).
A signed acknowledgment together with a random
monitoring scheme were shown to be a solution to de-
tecting the exact attacker peers. The former mechanism
is used by peers to prove their fairness, while the latter
helps trusted peers to monitor in a random fashion some
of their peers suspected to malfunction. The problem
with this solution design is that it relies on one single
session trust manager, which imposes a scalability is-
sue and a single point of failure. The trust manager
decides whether a peer is malicious or not, by receiv-
ing ‘complaints’ from peers and employing a localiza-
tion scheme. If it cannot detect the exact location of the
omission or forgery attack, the trust manager will de-
crease the trust value of both peers (the reporter and the
reported). Otherwise, the child and the tree that inherit
from the reported node are moved to another peer-tree.
On the downside, this solution does not handle col-
lusion attacks in the form of Sybil attacks: if a ma-
licious node assigns itself several identities, then the
only way to prevent it from gaining control is by assign-
ing strong identities from a central identity manager, or
conversely, to implement a punishment scheme, where
a malicious node can be evicted, provided bad service
or punished in money. Moreover, having the trust man-
ager as one fixed peer throughout all sessions is a single
point of failure, therefore passing this responsibility to
different nodes with high levels of trust for each session,
should be a straightforward improvement.
A common solution in tree-based approaches is given
by SecureStream [10]. SecureStream is able to repel
several types of attacks because of its multiple intrinsic
mechanisms that help in eliminating most vulnerabili-
ties. For example, in order to protect itself against mem-
bership attacks, SecureStream uses the Fireflies proto-
col in which members monitor each other in case of
failure, by pinging each other. The pinging protocol
is more complicated in that is it based on the gossip
protocol, that each node is assigned certain other nodes
to monitor, and there is a limitation on the number of
neighbors that a certain node can accuse of failures (this
comes to stop malicious nodes from accusing too many
fair ones). Obviously, each peer has a predefined set of
neighbors.
To guarantee the integrity of the data being streamed
over the network, SecureStream avoids signing groups
of packets with asymmetric keys, but computes content
hashes that are signed with the sender’s private key. In
order to minimize the number of malicious neighbors,
this solution takes a smart approach: in each round, the
source of the transmission notifies its neighbors that it
has available packets. These packets last as long as an
availability window. Each neighbor, in its turn, requests
from the source the packets that it misses (this is the
interest window), but trying not to overload the source.
Whenever they obtain a new packet, these neighbors in
their turn will send notifications to other neighbors, and
so on. Overall, this method of dissemination is resilient
to attacks, especially omission attacks: if a peer does
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not reply with the promised packet, then another one is
contacted. It should be noted here that the nodes located
close to the source do not necessarily receive packets
faster.
Moreover, there is a limit in the number of requests
that arrive at a peer (this repels the possibility of node
flooding). In order to eliminate free riders, an audit-
ing mechanism ensures that all nodes contribute to the
protocol at least as specified by a fixed limit. Auditing
is distributed: local auditors are periodically elected to
evaluate the contribution of each of their neighbors. The
punishing of nodes that behave malicious, as well as
employing the pull-approach that disables attackers to
gain control deterministically over sets of nodes, these
are the salient features that make SecureStream tolerant
to Byzantine attacks. In comparison to the BAR-Gossip
approach described in Sect.4.3, it can be noted that the
source does not need to know all the members of the
protocol: here the membership is dynamic, so scalabil-
ity is not bounded.
4.2 Mesh-based Approaches
Mesh-shaped overlays carry less structure in compar-
ison to the tree solutions. A membership server may
keep track of the existing nodes in the system if re-
quired, and there is no fixed flow that data must follow.
Recent works see these meshes as unidirectional, in the
sense that nodes always have an inbound and outbound
degree. The number of neighbors that a node can accept
is limited only by resources.
Empirically, a comparison between multi-tree and
mesh-based overlays in streaming scenarios is given
in [20, 18] and the conclusion is that mesh approaches
are more robust. The study shows that overlays that
are mesh-shaped bear better performance when the size
of the network is large, the streaming rates are high,
and the nodes have high bandwidth and low round-trip
times. On the downside, they introduce a large num-
ber of duplicate packets in the network. Multi-trees, in
comparison, are more time-efficient in heterogeneous
networks, but on large scales they perform worse than
meshes. Some issues of the mesh-based overlay are
shown in Table 5.
Two classical examples in mesh-based overlay solu-
tions are Prime [17] and CoolStreaming [27]. In Cool-
Streaming, the approach is data-driven: the data avail-
ability drives further propagation; gossip communica-
tion is used to disseminate network membership and
content availability. Building on CoolStreaming, which
Envisaged solutions Problem
Monitor and audit schemes
Identifying malicious nodes
Flooding, omission attacks
Membership attacks
Not yet solved
Collusion attacks
Data diffusion problems
Acknowledgment / Repudiation pb.
Table 5: Common security issues in mesh-based P2P
streaming systems.
does not form a typical mesh but several trees onto
an initial mesh, Prime is historically one of the first
mesh streaming systems. In Prime, content delivery
(or swarming) has two phases: push reporting is done
by parents (announcing availability of data) and pull-
reporting by children (retrieving data using some packet
scheduling algorithm). For advertising the new content
dedicated links are in place (diffusion connections) over
diffusion trees.
From a security point of view, neither Prime nor
CoolStreaming protect themselves from effects of sev-
eral types of attacks. For example, Prime assumes that
peers are all fair and connect in a random fashion one
with another. Moreover, it is assumed that the mesh
formed by peers is directed – every node has an inbound
and an outbound degree. Since there is no mechanism to
check whether instead of randomness, some nodes can
connect only to certain their nodes on purpose, so coali-
tions (or network partitioning) can form. Apart from
the simple collusion attack, the integrity of the diffusion
connections is not enforced. There is no mechanism in
place to make sure that one node declares its content
availability to all or none or a fraction of its neighbors;
there is no guarantee that the bandwidth, outgoing and
ingoing degree of each node are used properly. Even
more importantly, there is the issue of acknowledge-
ment and repudiation: there is no guarantee that peers
eventually receive (some) streaming data.
4.3 Gossiping and Byzantine Faults
Gossip algorithms are mostly used for content dissem-
ination in dynamic distributed systems. They rely on
what is termed as “probabilistic exchange of informa-
tion” [13]: nodes use randomness in determining to
which neighbor they would forward/retrieve data. Gos-
sip protocols in general are robust, scalable and rapidly
spreading information, their only fault being that they
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might generate more traffic than the nodes can handle.
This traffic quantity, however, is a price that gossip pro-
tocols pay for redundancy. Still, even if dangerous, they
can become a very useful tool for rapid and scalable epi-
demic dissemination when proper attention is given to
the message propagation mechanism.
Based on an analytic view [13], there are three main
features of common to gossip protocols:
• Peer selection is about how a peer A selects an-
other peer B in order to interact with it. This choice
must be done randomly in a typical gossip proto-
col, but it can be biased if the scheme is undergo-
ing an attack: peer A might see that there are three
other available peers B, C and D, but its choice
on communicating with B might not be a random
choice. For this reason, securing the gossiping pro-
tocol involves adding a mechanism to enforce that
peer selection is random and cannot be tampered
with.
• Data exchanged is an application-dependent
choice belonging to each of the two peers involved
in the exchange. It is not necessary that peers ex-
change data —they might as well exchange refer-
ences to other peers. From this point of view, it
is essential that neither of the two parties cheats:
one or both peers give the other junk data. This
constraint can be enforced by checking the validity
of the data right before the content exchange hap-
pens but before the communication between the
two peers ends. In addition, the security of the
channel established between the two peers must be
enacted.
• Data processing refers to how each peer handles
the data it has received. It involves either storing
the message for the next round or handing it to an
application. Neither the former nor the latter prob-
lem are of any concern in this paper.
Generally, gossip protocols are scalable and very re-
liable; by randomly selecting peers, gossiping avoids
message losses or node failures. Still, as noticed in [9],
gossip schemes cannot deal with situations in which at-
tackers falsify the information being disseminated from
one peer to another, because gossip protocols do not
verify the data being exchanged. This subclass of prob-
lems goes deep into the class of Byzantine faults. For
this reason, there are a number of solutions trying to ad-
dress these issues, and hereafter we will briefly discuss
some of them.
Compared to previous structured overlay approaches,
a more realistic solution (from the point of view of
Byzantine faults) to P2P streaming is given by Dolev
et al. in S-Fireflies [8]. The purpose of the P2P overlay
network is double: tolerate Byzantine nodes and self-
stabilize (to adapt dynamically to churn). S-Fireflies
builds probabilistic graphs (random graphs) with nodes
of low in- and out-degrees, that is stable in terms of
Byzantine presence. The result of the algorithm is the
enforcement of a ’rigid’ complete graph, so that nodes
get to know all their neighbors (with a high probability).
Onto this robust connection graph, Dolev et al. establish
a monitoring mechanism that uses gossip to report node
failures and propagate transmission rounds. The proto-
col is verifiable at the level of each node, so any peer
can verify that another node communicates with correct
neighbors. Moreover, there is an enforcement mecha-
nism for nodes not to impersonate other nodes. In terms
of the streaming session, there is a system-wide process
with the purpose of updating all nodes in the network;
even if a quarter of the whole number of nodes are tem-
porarily faulty, the system is still able to recover.
The above solution provides some useful mecha-
nisms for a P2P network to timely adapt to Byzantine
faults: the construction of the random graph coupled
with verifiable adaptiveness. However, although it con-
trols the effect of malicious behavior in its general form,
it does not deal with the causes of this behavior: nodes
should be encouraged to participate in the game, be-
cause the more peers, the better the performance of the
streaming session.
BAR-Gossip (Byzantine-Altruistic-Rational) [15] is
the next step in making P2P streaming more secure and
less treacherous. This new model increases the safety
and liveness guarantees formerly offered by Byzantine
fault tolerance because it features an incentive-based
mechanism for non-byzantine peers that may become
malicious. This solution leverages on three different
peer behaviors: purely byzantine, altruistic and rational
nodes. The modification to the original peer selection
scheme in gossip, is that this process is pseudo-random
and verifiable. The strength of the overall protocol is
multiple-fold:
• it is extremely robust when faced with Byzantine
and selfish nodes,
• it can face collusion attacks,
• it provides stable short-term throughput, while the
bulk of the other approaches target maximizing
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bandwidth on the long term,
• it is usable for short-window transmission-
s/streaming,
• it does not use reputations, so Sybil attacks are al-
ready dealt with.
BAR-Gossip functions in rounds, or transmission ses-
sions; in every round, the source transmits the correct
packets, and then peer nodes propagate these packets
simultaneously in two schemes: a balanced exchange,
and an optimistic push (of non-expired packets) proto-
col. BAR-Gossip also details the explicit exchange pro-
tocol between nodes, and takes all actions to balance the
amount of information that is swapped between the two
sides (very much like tit-for-tat). Moreover, the proto-
col seeks to monitor and reward/punish individual node
activity so that there is an overall equilibrium between
all nodes involved. Some solutions that this protocol
gives to common problems, are:
• neighbor selection attacks, because selection be-
comes now verifiable. On the downside, however,
the convergence is not as fast as in the traditional
gossip way, because the mechanism of selecting
neighbors replaces just randomness with pseudo-
randomness and verification performed by the se-
lected node onto the selector.
• nodes lying about their history It is no longer desir-
able to lie in the short-term, because it is no longer
in their interest neither to under-report nor to over-
report their packet history.
• forgery attacks are repelled because of a clever
mechanism by which data is first traded and ver-
ified, and then exchanged for good. If the data is
forged, this would be noticed before the actual ex-
change, so the potential receiver would realize the
attack and report it. Again, making sure that data
is not forged prior to the exchange involves more
overhead in the transmission.
• stability on the short term is also grounded on the
notion of Nash equilibria, so that any node would
consider that its peers are following the protocol.
This belief is actually an incentive to act by the
protocol, to the node itself.
• no free-riders Eliminating free-riders is achieved
by allowing junk updates, to compensate for the
free-updates of an altruistic node.
Nevertheless, BAR-Gossip has its limitations. First
if all, it only supports a static membership system, that
is —all participating nodes first subscribe to the broad-
caster before any round— to this end, the system gains
a centralized identity management scheme with a static
list of node id-s. In the case of large amounts of nodes
that come and leave, this could turn into a scalability
problem. In addition, by using the comments in [1], the
question of how would nodes discover themselves can
arise; discovery is arguably the heart of gossip-based
protocols, so a discovery solution should consider the
topology of the network, and should be as decentralized
as possible so that nodes can use it at all times.
Furthermore, it can be noticed that in the case of
the optimistic push protocol, nodes are likely to waste
bandwidth by sending junk —this again can turn into a
problem if bandwidth is scarce or the quantity of junk
that is being sent is large. From this points of view,
an interesting idea would be that of Martin in [19],
where the efforts are concentrated toward leveraging on
altruistic nodes to carry the burden of rational nodes.
In other words, in the BAR-Gossip solution, altruistic
nodes and rational ones behave in the same way ac-
cording to the specification; however, rational nodes
may refuse to participate in some computation if the
cost of their involvement is higher than their utility. In
this case, performance of the overall system can be im-
proved if altruistic nodes take upon themselves the work
that was refused by the rational nodes. Of course, bur-
dening altruistic nodes should be done with a reward,
as much as ‘anarchy’ (rational nodes refusing participa-
tion) should be punished.
5 Discussion
There are a number of vulnerabilities that P2P solutions
are prone to. When it comes to live streaming, problems
get worse because of the bandwidth demand and time-
liness of this type of systems. Seamless performance
and attack-proof design are impossible to achieve at the
same time. Even worse, given the large variety of at-
tacks, countering all or most of them is even more chal-
lenging.
5.1 Tradeoffs: Security vs. Performance
BAR-Gossip is able to overcome a very large number
of different attacks from the list in Section 3, but there
is a number of trade-offs it has introduced in return (see
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Tradeoff between... ...and
punishing innocent nodes fairness incentives
neighbor choosing dynamic peer membership
bandwidth utilization allowing fake data delivery
timeliness punishment for misbehaving nodes
performance cryptographic schemes used
Table 6: Tradeoffs in BAR-Gossip.
Table 6). The essential idea it applies in order to repel a
large range of attacks is to encourage nodes to behave.
If nodes misbehave, then they are punished; this can
be easily implemented by some form of penalty or by
placing the wrong-doers further away from the source
of broadcast, thus ensuring that their possibility to harm
is diminished. However, it is easy to notice that punish-
ing one node may involve punishing the nodes that the
current node will communicate with; thus, the effect of
the punishment is likely to occur to innocent nodes as
well. This is a trade-off in its own way: the decision to
punish also some nodes that do not misbehave, in order
to ‘set an example’ for other nodes.
Neighbor choosing is another trade-off. Instead of al-
lowing a tree-like structure in which nodes know from
the beginning who to communicate with, it is wiser,
from a security point of view, to sacrifice some per-
formance in order to eliminate vulnerabilities as much
as possible. Using the pseudo-random scheme together
with selection verification is a far safer approach that
using a centralized membership directory, which apart
from bearing scalability problems, is also a single point
of failure. From this point of view, there is another
trade-off remarked by Jesi in [12]: BAR gossip is able
to let neighbors control how random the peer selection
process is for certain nodes, at the cost of ruling out
dynamic peer membership. This is the reason why all
peers first have to register themselves to the broadcaster,
before participating to the streaming round. If it were to
perform this sacrifice the other way around, Jesi’s solu-
tion caters for dynamic membership where nobody can
control how randomly a node selects its neighbors.
Bandwidth utilization is the reason of another com-
promise. Since there can be nodes that offer packets
(data) at a lower cost than any other nodes, this would
imply that all requesters would crowd to use these free
suppliers; balance is brought into this scene by intro-
ducing the possibility that requester nodes receive junk
if they turn into a burden for the altruistic ones. In this
case however, bandwidth is wasted with the sole pur-
pose of ‘teaching a lesson’ to the misbehaving nodes.
Timeliness of transmission is very seldom compro-
mised in P2P streaming solutions. This is straightfor-
ward for the simple reason that users hate choppiness
or low quality, and as long as they encounter any of
them, they leave the system. Because this is not in the
system’s best interest —the more users, the higher the
combined bandwidth— then timeliness is not a param-
eter to be touched. However, if nodes misbehave, pun-
ishment can take the form of placing these nodes farther
from the source (if applicable), with the clear effect of
obtaining packets which are closer to expiry.
Furthermore, protection mechanisms come in place
over the transmission data to insure its integrity, con-
fidentiality and fair-use. Overall, these mechanisms,
ranging from signing, to briefcase negotiation and even-
tually briefcase exchange, function in the detriment of
performance. Each node consumes bandwidth and pro-
cessor cycles for the system’s best interest, even if it is
not always in its own interest. Of course, nodes should
not be allowed to act by themselves, and as long as
the risks that they encounter are the same for all other
nodes, the same measures should be taken for them all.
Needless to mention, again —countering any forms of
‘anarchy’ assures the well-being of the entire system;
for that, an incentive/punishment technique needs to be
in place to protect the streaming process.
5.2 Further Work
Currently, collusion attacks remain one of the most
problematic types of attacks in P2P streaming systems.
Collusion do not necessarily mean the protocol is not
respected, but it can also refer to a slight deviation from
the protocol, which is hard to locate and cure. In BAR-
Gossip, for instance, collusion may occur to rational
nodes: a group of nodes that are not satisfied with the
previous exchanges, group together in order to max-
imize collective utility. Their uncooperative behavior
toward the rest of the network can manifest in a slower
propagation of messages in the exterior of their group,
compared to the one within the group. Again, this does
not disrupt the overall protocol, it just decreases its ef-
fectiveness.
In addition, more work is needed as to analyze the
utility of nodes to deviate from the protocol; finding a
bound for this utility, correlated with the application,
would be useful in finding quantitative incentives for
not deviating from the protocol. Moreover, churn in
streaming systems remains another open problem, for
which one possible solution can be that of self-adaptive
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networks, as described in 4.3.
6 Conclusions
A common security approach applicable in any domain
is a combination of preventive and detective measures.
In practice, by no means the possibility of countering
attacks can be null, so as long as the system keeps some
functionality, circumvention of its mechanisms remains
probable. Thus, it is not only the preventive/reactive
measures that require attention, but also the detective
ones. Specifically, once an attack happened, it needs to
be confined to as small an area of the P2P network as
possible. Once the attacker cannot easily gain control
over a bigger portion of the system, some mechanisms
need to be in place to detect its actions and eventually
its location. It is not always easy to detect who the ma-
licious node is (it is always from within the network,
assuming that no other hosts can interfere with the pro-
tocol) but in practice there are some techniques that can
be used for this purpose: one of them is the one re-
quiring a trust manager [22], with the addition that this
machine needs to be replaced periodically, and should
not be central to the whole network (since we want
to eliminate single points of failures). A complemen-
tary approach is to use the mechanism of incentives and
punishments, where nodes are stimulated to stick to the
protocol; if they do not comply, then a distributed mon-
itoring mechanism (performed via the malicious nodes’
neighbors) should help in enforcing a punishment onto
the bad performers. Moreover, audit is another tech-
nique not to be overlooked: it can provide essential in-
formation on the behavior of the entire protocol as well
as of individual nodes.
As shown in the previous examples, tree-based
streaming in P2P networks are not only vulnerable to
protocol failure, but are also far faster contaminated by
an attacker if the hierarchy of nodes is fixed. In the
eventuality no other constraints are put onto the degree
of each node (either inbound or outbound), then the
structure is vulnerable and cannot contain most attacks.
This happens because in a tree, if a node is contami-
nated, then its children will be too. In a mesh, on the
other hand, the infection spreads in a one-by-one fash-
ion rather than in a one-to-many fashion.
Compared to tree-based streaming, mesh and gossip
approaches are more robust, scalable and Byzantine-
tolerant. The largest amount of recent works concen-
trate on either of these two approaches, and attach a
wide variety of additional mechanisms in order to coun-
teract as many attack types as possible. The overall
trend is to delegate many monitoring and security func-
tions to each peer instead of keeping separate entities
exclusively for these tasks. Membership and neighbor
selection mechanisms are driving the flow of any dif-
ferent protocol, while tune-ups mostly try to leverage
churn and node coalitions.
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